106 lines
4.3 KiB
Markdown
106 lines
4.3 KiB
Markdown
---
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title: Permissivism
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TARGET DECK: Obsidian::H&SS
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FILE TAGS: ontology::permissivism
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tags:
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- ontology
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- permissivism
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---
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## Overview
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Roughly speaking, permissivism refers to the stance that everything that can be described without (at least obvious) contradiction exists. Generally speaking, permissivists tend to think the question of whether or not things exist is trivial to answer.
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%%ANKI
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Basic
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What is permissivism?
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Back: The view that everything describable (without obvious) contradiction exists.
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Reference: Simon Hewitt, “A Cardinal Worry for Permissive Metaontology,” _Metaphysica_ 16, no. 2 (September 18, 2015): 159–65, [https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2015-0009](https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2015-0009).
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<!--ID: 1720912238010-->
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END%%
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%%ANKI
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Basic
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What metaontological view proposes answering customary existence questions in the affirmative?
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Back: Permissivism.
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Reference: Simon Hewitt, “A Cardinal Worry for Permissive Metaontology,” _Metaphysica_ 16, no. 2 (September 18, 2015): 159–65, [https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2015-0009](https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2015-0009).
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<!--ID: 1720912238016-->
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END%%
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%%ANKI
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Basic
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What triviality is usually associated with permissivists?
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Back: Permissivists tend to think most existence questions admit purely trivial answers.
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Reference: Simon Hewitt, “A Cardinal Worry for Permissive Metaontology,” _Metaphysica_ 16, no. 2 (September 18, 2015): 159–65, [https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2015-0009](https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2015-0009).
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<!--ID: 1720965569467-->
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END%%
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%%ANKI
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Basic
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In permissivism, what is the antecedent to consequent "$X$ exists"?
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Back: "$X$ can be described without contradiction."
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Reference: Simon Hewitt, “A Cardinal Worry for Permissive Metaontology,” _Metaphysica_ 16, no. 2 (September 18, 2015): 159–65, [https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2015-0009](https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2015-0009).
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<!--ID: 1720912238023-->
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END%%
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%%ANKI
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Basic
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In permissivism, what is the conseqent to antecedent "$X$ can be described without contradiction"?
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Back: "$X$ exists."
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Reference: Simon Hewitt, “A Cardinal Worry for Permissive Metaontology,” _Metaphysica_ 16, no. 2 (September 18, 2015): 159–65, [https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2015-0009](https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2015-0009).
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<!--ID: 1720912238027-->
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END%%
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%%ANKI
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Basic
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How would a permissivist answer the question, "What is there?"
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Back: "Everything describable without contradiction."
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Reference: Nikk Effingham, _An Introduction to Ontology_ (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013).
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<!--ID: 1720912238031-->
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END%%
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%%ANKI
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Basic
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How is English statement "There is an $X$" interpreted by a permissivist?
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Back: As "$X$ exists".
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Reference: Nikk Effingham, _An Introduction to Ontology_ (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013).
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<!--ID: 1720912238035-->
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END%%
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%%ANKI
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Basic
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*Can* a permissivist commit to the existence of square circles?
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Back: Yes.
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Reference: Nikk Effingham, _An Introduction to Ontology_ (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013).
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<!--ID: 1720912238038-->
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END%%
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%%ANKI
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Basic
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*Need* a permissivist commit to the existence of square circles?
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Back: No.
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Reference: Nikk Effingham, _An Introduction to Ontology_ (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013).
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<!--ID: 1720912238042-->
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END%%
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%%ANKI
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Basic
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What general strategy is used as an argument against permissivism?
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Back: Individually acceptable committments lead to contradictions when accepted jointly.
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Reference: Nikk Effingham, _An Introduction to Ontology_ (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013).
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<!--ID: 1720912238045-->
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END%%
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%%ANKI
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Basic
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What Russell-like paradox is typically used to argue against permissivism?
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Back: The paradox of non-self-instantiation.
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Reference: Nikk Effingham, _An Introduction to Ontology_ (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013).
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<!--ID: 1720912238049-->
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END%%
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## Bibliography
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* Francesco Orilia and Michele Paolini Paoletti, “Properties,” in _The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy_, ed. Edward N. Zalta, Spring 2022 (Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2022), [https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2022/entries/properties/](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2022/entries/properties/).
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* Nikk Effingham, _An Introduction to Ontology_ (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013).
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* Simon Hewitt, “A Cardinal Worry for Permissive Metaontology,” _Metaphysica_ 16, no. 2 (September 18, 2015): 159–65, [https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2015-0009](https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2015-0009). |