---
title: Ontology
TARGET DECK: Obsidian::H&SS
FILE TAGS: ontology
tags:
  - ontology
---

## Overview

Ontology is the philosophical study of being. Generally *things* are split into two broad categories: **abstract** and **concrete** things. These words are "terms of art" and their definition is not standardized in any way.

%%ANKI
Basic
What did Quine declare as *the* ontological question?
Back: "What is there?"
Reference: Simon Hewitt, “A Cardinal Worry for Permissive Metaontology,” _Metaphysica_ 16, no. 2 (September 18, 2015): 159–65, [https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2015-0009](https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2015-0009).
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END%%

%%ANKI
Basic
Who is attributed *the* ontological question?
Back: Willard Van Orman Quine.
Reference: Simon Hewitt, “A Cardinal Worry for Permissive Metaontology,” _Metaphysica_ 16, no. 2 (September 18, 2015): 159–65, [https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2015-0009](https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2015-0009).
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END%%

%%ANKI
Cloze
{Ontology} is the {philosophical study of being}.
Reference: Nikk Effingham, _An Introduction to Ontology_ (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013).
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END%%

%%ANKI
Cloze
{Epistemology} is the {philosophical study of knowledge}.
Reference: Nikk Effingham, _An Introduction to Ontology_ (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013).
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END%%

%%ANKI
Cloze
{Taxonomy} is the {branch of science concerned with categorization}.
Reference: Nikk Effingham, _An Introduction to Ontology_ (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013).
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END%%

%%ANKI
Cloze
{Mereology} is the {philosophical study of part-whole relationships}.
Reference: Nikk Effingham, _An Introduction to Ontology_ (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013).
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END%%

%%ANKI
Basic
What does Effingham mean when saying "concreta" and "abstracta" are terms of art?
Back: They are terms defined freely by a person to mean whatever one wants.
Reference: Nikk Effingham, _An Introduction to Ontology_ (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013).
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END%%

%%ANKI
Cloze
In general, ontologists often categorize things as either {concreta} or {abstracta}.
Reference: Nikk Effingham, _An Introduction to Ontology_ (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013).
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END%%

%%ANKI
Basic
Generally speaking, what does someone *probably* mean by "concrete" things?
Back: Things that exists in space and/or time.
Reference: Nikk Effingham, _An Introduction to Ontology_ (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013).
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END%%

%%ANKI
Basic
Generally speaking, what does someone *probably* mean by "abstract" things?
Back: Things that exist in neither space nor time.
Reference: Nikk Effingham, _An Introduction to Ontology_ (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013).
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END%%

%%ANKI
Basic
Is a material object considered concreta?
Back: Usually.
Reference: Nikk Effingham, _An Introduction to Ontology_ (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013).
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END%%

%%ANKI
Basic
Is an immaterial object considered concreta?
Back: Possibly.
Reference: Nikk Effingham, _An Introduction to Ontology_ (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013).
<!--ID: 1720894782978-->
END%%

%%ANKI
Basic
Is a material object considered abstracta?
Back: Not usually.
Reference: Nikk Effingham, _An Introduction to Ontology_ (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013).
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END%%

%%ANKI
Basic
Is an immaterial object considered abstracta?
Back: Possibly.
Reference: Nikk Effingham, _An Introduction to Ontology_ (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013).
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END%%

## Bibliography

* Francesco Orilia and Michele Paolini Paoletti, “Properties,” in _The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy_, ed. Edward N. Zalta, Spring 2022 (Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2022), [https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2022/entries/properties/](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2022/entries/properties/).
* Nikk Effingham, _An Introduction to Ontology_ (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013).
* Simon Hewitt, “A Cardinal Worry for Permissive Metaontology,” _Metaphysica_ 16, no. 2 (September 18, 2015): 159–65, [https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2015-0009](https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2015-0009).