211 lines
7.6 KiB
Markdown
211 lines
7.6 KiB
Markdown
|
---
|
|||
|
|
title: Ontology
|
|||
|
|
TARGET DECK: Obsidian::H&SS
|
|||
|
|
FILE TAGS: ontology::philosophy
|
|||
|
|
tags:
|
|||
|
|
- ontology
|
|||
|
|
---
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
## Overview
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
Ontology is the philosophical study of being. Generally *things* are split into two broad categories: **abstract** and **concrete** things. These words are "terms of art" and their definition is not standardized in any way.
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
%%ANKI
|
|||
|
|
Basic
|
|||
|
|
What did Quine declare as *the* ontological question?
|
|||
|
|
Back: "What is there?"
|
|||
|
|
Reference: Simon Hewitt, “A Cardinal Worry for Permissive Metaontology,” _Metaphysica_ 16, no. 2 (September 18, 2015): 159–65, [https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2015-0009](https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2015-0009).
|
|||
|
|
<!--ID: 1720912238054-->
|
|||
|
|
END%%
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
%%ANKI
|
|||
|
|
Basic
|
|||
|
|
Who is attributed *the* ontological question?
|
|||
|
|
Back: Willard Van Orman Quine.
|
|||
|
|
Reference: Simon Hewitt, “A Cardinal Worry for Permissive Metaontology,” _Metaphysica_ 16, no. 2 (September 18, 2015): 159–65, [https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2015-0009](https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2015-0009).
|
|||
|
|
<!--ID: 1720912259767-->
|
|||
|
|
END%%
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
%%ANKI
|
|||
|
|
Cloze
|
|||
|
|
{Ontology} is the {philosophical study of being}.
|
|||
|
|
Reference: Nikk Effingham, _An Introduction to Ontology_ (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013).
|
|||
|
|
<!--ID: 1720912238058-->
|
|||
|
|
END%%
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
%%ANKI
|
|||
|
|
Cloze
|
|||
|
|
{Epistemology} is the {philosophical study of knowledge}.
|
|||
|
|
Reference: Nikk Effingham, _An Introduction to Ontology_ (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013).
|
|||
|
|
<!--ID: 1720912238062-->
|
|||
|
|
END%%
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
%%ANKI
|
|||
|
|
Cloze
|
|||
|
|
{Taxonomy} is the {branch of science concerned with categorization}.
|
|||
|
|
Reference: Nikk Effingham, _An Introduction to Ontology_ (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013).
|
|||
|
|
<!--ID: 1720912238066-->
|
|||
|
|
END%%
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
%%ANKI
|
|||
|
|
Cloze
|
|||
|
|
{Mereology} is the {philosophical study of part-whole relationships}.
|
|||
|
|
Reference: Nikk Effingham, _An Introduction to Ontology_ (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013).
|
|||
|
|
<!--ID: 1720998380912-->
|
|||
|
|
END%%
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
%%ANKI
|
|||
|
|
Basic
|
|||
|
|
What does Effingham mean when saying "concreta" and "abstracta" are terms of art?
|
|||
|
|
Back: They are terms defined freely by a person to mean whatever one wants.
|
|||
|
|
Reference: Nikk Effingham, _An Introduction to Ontology_ (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013).
|
|||
|
|
<!--ID: 1720894782942-->
|
|||
|
|
END%%
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
%%ANKI
|
|||
|
|
Cloze
|
|||
|
|
In general, ontologists often categorize things as either {concreta} or {abstracta}.
|
|||
|
|
Reference: Nikk Effingham, _An Introduction to Ontology_ (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013).
|
|||
|
|
<!--ID: 1720894782951-->
|
|||
|
|
END%%
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
%%ANKI
|
|||
|
|
Basic
|
|||
|
|
Generally speaking, what does someone *probably* mean by "concrete" things?
|
|||
|
|
Back: Things that exists in space and/or time.
|
|||
|
|
Reference: Nikk Effingham, _An Introduction to Ontology_ (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013).
|
|||
|
|
<!--ID: 1720894782957-->
|
|||
|
|
END%%
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
%%ANKI
|
|||
|
|
Basic
|
|||
|
|
Generally speaking, what does someone *probably* mean by "abstract" things?
|
|||
|
|
Back: Things that exist in neither space nor time.
|
|||
|
|
Reference: Nikk Effingham, _An Introduction to Ontology_ (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013).
|
|||
|
|
<!--ID: 1720894782965-->
|
|||
|
|
END%%
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
%%ANKI
|
|||
|
|
Basic
|
|||
|
|
Is a material object considered concreta?
|
|||
|
|
Back: Usually.
|
|||
|
|
Reference: Nikk Effingham, _An Introduction to Ontology_ (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013).
|
|||
|
|
<!--ID: 1720894782971-->
|
|||
|
|
END%%
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
%%ANKI
|
|||
|
|
Basic
|
|||
|
|
Is an immaterial object considered concreta?
|
|||
|
|
Back: Possibly.
|
|||
|
|
Reference: Nikk Effingham, _An Introduction to Ontology_ (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013).
|
|||
|
|
<!--ID: 1720894782978-->
|
|||
|
|
END%%
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
%%ANKI
|
|||
|
|
Basic
|
|||
|
|
Is a material object considered abstracta?
|
|||
|
|
Back: Not usually.
|
|||
|
|
Reference: Nikk Effingham, _An Introduction to Ontology_ (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013).
|
|||
|
|
<!--ID: 1720894782984-->
|
|||
|
|
END%%
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
%%ANKI
|
|||
|
|
Basic
|
|||
|
|
Is an immaterial object considered abstracta?
|
|||
|
|
Back: Possibly.
|
|||
|
|
Reference: Nikk Effingham, _An Introduction to Ontology_ (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013).
|
|||
|
|
<!--ID: 1720894782989-->
|
|||
|
|
END%%
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
## Properties
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
A **property** is an entity that can be predicated of things or, in other words, attributed to them.
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
%%ANKI
|
|||
|
|
Basic
|
|||
|
|
What is a property?
|
|||
|
|
Back: An entity that can be predicated or attributed to things.
|
|||
|
|
Reference: Francesco Orilia and Michele Paolini Paoletti, “Properties,” in _The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy_, ed. Edward N. Zalta, Spring 2022 (Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2022), [https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2022/entries/properties/](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2022/entries/properties/).
|
|||
|
|
<!--ID: 1720912237900-->
|
|||
|
|
END%%
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
### Instantiation
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
An entity is said to **instantiate** a property if said entity bears a connection to the property. For example, a human instantiates the property of *being human* and a man instantiates the properties of *being human* and *being a man*.
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
%%ANKI
|
|||
|
|
Basic
|
|||
|
|
What is instantiation?
|
|||
|
|
Back: A relation held between an entity and the properties that describe the entity.
|
|||
|
|
Reference: Nikk Effingham, _An Introduction to Ontology_ (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013).
|
|||
|
|
<!--ID: 1720912237951-->
|
|||
|
|
END%%
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
%%ANKI
|
|||
|
|
Cloze
|
|||
|
|
A man is said to {instantiate} the property of *being a man*.
|
|||
|
|
Reference: Nikk Effingham, _An Introduction to Ontology_ (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013).
|
|||
|
|
<!--ID: 1720912237960-->
|
|||
|
|
END%%
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
%%ANKI
|
|||
|
|
Basic
|
|||
|
|
What is self-instantiation?
|
|||
|
|
Back: The instantiation of a property by itself.
|
|||
|
|
Reference: Nikk Effingham, _An Introduction to Ontology_ (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013).
|
|||
|
|
<!--ID: 1720912237967-->
|
|||
|
|
END%%
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
%%ANKI
|
|||
|
|
Basic
|
|||
|
|
What is non-self-instantiation?
|
|||
|
|
Back: The non-instantiation of a property by itself.
|
|||
|
|
Reference: Nikk Effingham, _An Introduction to Ontology_ (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013).
|
|||
|
|
<!--ID: 1720912237974-->
|
|||
|
|
END%%
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
%%ANKI
|
|||
|
|
Basic
|
|||
|
|
Suppose all properties are self-instantiating. What must be said about *being honest*?
|
|||
|
|
Back: The property *being honest* is honest.
|
|||
|
|
Reference: Francesco Orilia and Michele Paolini Paoletti, “Properties,” in _The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy_, ed. Edward N. Zalta, Spring 2022 (Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2022), [https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2022/entries/properties/](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2022/entries/properties/).
|
|||
|
|
<!--ID: 1720912237980-->
|
|||
|
|
END%%
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
%%ANKI
|
|||
|
|
Basic
|
|||
|
|
Suppose properties are abstracta. What self-instantiation is thus formed?
|
|||
|
|
Back: The property of abstractness is abstract.
|
|||
|
|
Reference: Francesco Orilia and Michele Paolini Paoletti, “Properties,” in _The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy_, ed. Edward N. Zalta, Spring 2022 (Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2022), [https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2022/entries/properties/](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2022/entries/properties/).
|
|||
|
|
<!--ID: 1720912237986-->
|
|||
|
|
END%%
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
%%ANKI
|
|||
|
|
Basic
|
|||
|
|
What is the paradox of non-self-instantiation?
|
|||
|
|
Back: The property *non-self-instantiation* is non-self-instantiating iff it is self-instantiating.
|
|||
|
|
Reference: Nikk Effingham, _An Introduction to Ontology_ (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013).
|
|||
|
|
<!--ID: 1720912237992-->
|
|||
|
|
END%%
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
%%ANKI
|
|||
|
|
Basic
|
|||
|
|
Let $P$ be the property *is non-self-instantiating*. What happens if $P$ is non-self-instantiating?
|
|||
|
|
Back: Then $P$ must be self-instantiating.
|
|||
|
|
Reference: Nikk Effingham, _An Introduction to Ontology_ (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013).
|
|||
|
|
<!--ID: 1720912237998-->
|
|||
|
|
END%%
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
%%ANKI
|
|||
|
|
Basic
|
|||
|
|
Let $P$ be the property *is non-self-instantiating*. What happens if $P$ is self-instantiating?
|
|||
|
|
Back: Then $P$ must be non-self-instantiating.
|
|||
|
|
Reference: Nikk Effingham, _An Introduction to Ontology_ (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013).
|
|||
|
|
<!--ID: 1720912238004-->
|
|||
|
|
END%%
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
## Bibliography
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
* Francesco Orilia and Michele Paolini Paoletti, “Properties,” in _The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy_, ed. Edward N. Zalta, Spring 2022 (Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2022), [https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2022/entries/properties/](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2022/entries/properties/).
|
|||
|
|
* Nikk Effingham, _An Introduction to Ontology_ (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013).
|
|||
|
|
* Simon Hewitt, “A Cardinal Worry for Permissive Metaontology,” _Metaphysica_ 16, no. 2 (September 18, 2015): 159–65, [https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2015-0009](https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2015-0009).
|